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To abandon your native tongue and adopt another is to dismantle yourself, piece by 
piece, and then put yourself together again, in a different form. 
––Costica Bradatan, Born Again in a Second Language  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 In directing our attention to mundane aspects of the human experience, we can discover 
new ways of interacting with and understanding the world. One such formative experience, 
regularly seen as mundane in much of the world, is learning a second language. It is no 
exaggeration to say that second language acquisition is one of the processes which most 
influences and drives our globalized world, and yet we understand and study this process 
relatively little.    
 Continuing the trends of naturalizing phenomenological inquiry, this project attempts to 
evaluate phenomenological approaches to skill acquisition alongside second language acquisition 
theory and research through an explicitly embodied lens. Through this pluralistic methodology, 
acquiring a second language can be reevaluated as a process which reveals much about how 
human beings interact with and understand their environment. In emphasizing the 
phenomenological aspects, it is possible to understand this process as attuned to lived 
experience. Finally, an embodied (especially enactive) lens decentralizes philosophically, and 
scientifically, problematic representationalist understandings of the mind and intelligence, 
further resituating our relationship with reality and language as a lived, irreducible process. 
Phenomenology of language, in general, offers an atypical take on language that moves 
philosophers away from use of representation and towards lived experience (Inkpin, 2017). This 
project focuses in on the understudied process of second language acquisition.  
 Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the investigation, I will take two chapters to explain 
the background concepts and theories involved. Chapter 2a (Background Concepts) will briefly 
explain the phenomenological method used in this project, followed by an explanation of 
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representational or embodied takes on the mind. Finally, I will present enactivism, a variation on 
embodied cognition, as the framework for the remainder of the investigation. Chapter 2b 
(Background Theory) will then explain a number of significant theories and debates in 
philosophy of language and applied linguistics (most especially second-language acquisition). I 
will explain both skill acquisition and sociocultural theory of second language acquisition as 
mutually compatible and amenable to enactivism and phenomenology. Debates related to this 
central topic, such as mentalese, linguistic relativity and universal grammar, will then be 
highlighted briefly.  
 After the second chapter’s exploration of skill acquisition theory, Chapter 3 (Techne and 
Episteme) will explore the relationship between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, finding an 
informalist and practicalist approach the most amenable to a skill-based inquiry regarding 
language. Chapter 4 (Dreyfus: Skill Acquisition and Success) will explore Dreyfus’ five-stage 
model of skill acquisition and Soar theory, both commonly referenced and accepted in SLA and 
skill acquisition literature, and then continue on to discuss more embodied and social 
frameworks, such as Dreyfus’ skillful coping, Barnacles’ gut learning, Collins’ linguistic 
socialization, and Hutto’s cultural permeation. While slightly different in terms of their base 
assumptions and the problems they are attempting to solve, these frameworks are mutually 
compatible in helping us restructure our understanding of learning, skill and language to a more 
social and interactive framework.  
Chapter 5 (Heideggerian Disclosure and Attunement) will then explore Heideggerian 
phenomenology of language and Heideggerian phenomenology of skill as the underlying 
influence in Dreyfus’ phenomenology. After exploring the disclosive function of language, 
Heideggerian attunement can be understood not only as a set of ways in which we understand the 
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world, but also as a set of ways in which we understand language. This underscores the 
contextual and social approaches, demonstrating language acquisition as a dynamic and non-
linear process through which we understand and engage the world. In doing so, especially for the 
existential phenomenologists, we understand and engage ourselves. Chapter 6 (Towards a 
Phenomenology of Second Language Acquisition) will unify these various models to create a 
skill-oriented phenomenological account of second language acquisition.  
 Phenomenology of second language acquisition reflects an understanding of the human 
being as based in social context, through which in must negotiate thousands of specific instances, 
arriving at responses that are better or worse depending on these instances and the myriad factors 
that influence a decision. This is done without necessarily representing every aspect of the 
process internally, and as such may not involve much of what is traditionally considered 
necessary for intelligent learning. Our ability to acquire a new representational system through 
our social and contextual interactions has interesting consequences for what may constitute 
representation, content and scaffolding in enactivist and embodied inquiry. Second-language 
acquisition, as the rich process that it is, offers many potential avenues for enactivist and 
philosophical inquiry beyond the scope of an inquiry focused primarily on skill acquisition.  
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Chapter 2a: Background Concepts 
It is necessary before proceeding in this investigation to clarify a number of philosophical 
approaches that will be employed. A phenomenological approach, which is at the heart of this 
investigation, attempts to understand “things precisely as they are given to us” (Sokolowski, 
2000, p. 64). This can often entail a rejection of the appearance-reality distinction, and while 
qualia are key to this method, it is by no means the only feature noted. Rather, we are trying to 
understand certain features of lived experience in a way that is true to how we experience these 
features in our lives. In getting to the things themselves, to paraphrase Husserl’s motto, we often 
need to cast off, question or “bracket” the cultural or theoretical approaches we have of the 
experience we are studying.  
Sokolowski also identifies a number of concepts commonly used in phenomenological 
investigation. One such structure is the interplay between parts and wholes, in which the 
difference between an independent part of a whole and a moment should be considered. To 
describe an independent part Sokolowski uses the example of leaves and acorns, which are 
independent from their tree. In contrast, “the color red (or any other color), which cannot occur 
apart from some surface of spatial expanse” (2000, p. 65) is an example of a moment. This type 
of moment cannot be conceived of as separate from other moments or other parts of that 
experience of perception. A phenomenological investigation understands the interplay between 
the whole and the part, both when the part is independent, and when it constitutes a moment. 
Along the same lines, intersubjective experiences reflect differing and similar interactions with a 
feature of experience (p. 30).  
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Phenomenology has been paired with scientific methods of investigation with increasing 
frequency in the past few decades, especially with cognitive science. One result of such inter-
methodological investigation has been embodied cognition, which is an interdisciplinary 
research program based in the general rejection of mind-body dualism. To varying degrees, 
advocates of embodied cognition do not put as much emphasis on representationalist or 
computationalist views of the mind (Gallagher 2017).  
Computationalist accounts of the mind, as one type of representationalist accounts, 
gained steam in the past century, with the advent of the computer. While they often do not 
always make appeals to some spiritual aspect of the human being such as a soul, they can often 
face similar pitfalls when it comes to explaining how thoughts come to have content or come to 
represent something. Many find that this view of thought reduces thought to mere symbol 
manipulation, setting aside the importance of environment and context (Rescorla 2015). This 
critique of computationalism is best illustrated through the famous Chinese Room thought 
experiment. 
 Searle (1980) asks us to imagine that he has been placed in a room with two batches of 
writing in Chinese (which he does not speak) and is given a set of formal rules in English that 
allow him to match a question, in the first batch of writing, with the appropriate answer, found in 
the second batch. He can send these answers out of the room such that he appears to be a native 
Chinese speaker to those outside of the room. This production is entirely due to the formal rules 
at hand and not due to his understanding what is happening. The argument presented as an 
argument against artificial intelligence, and yet is frequently interpreted as a critique of 
representationalist views of the mind. Searle’s central critique is that the program has syntax but 
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lacks semantics (p. 422), since understanding in the Chinese Room experiment depends on a 
mind within the room doing the understanding, resulting in infinite regress.  
Advocates of embodied cognition attempt to integrate scientific and phenomenological 
accounts that can more accurately describe how a human being approaches reality without as 
much appeal to philosophically and scientifically dubious accounts that depend heavily on 
representation. Especially when discussing spontaneity and habitual responses, 
representationalist accounts impoverish the richness of response and are at times too slow for the 
processes we are looking at. This does not mean, even for the most radical philosophers of mind 
(Hutto & Myin, 2012), that representation has no role whatsoever, but rather that it has been 
given an outsized importance in philosophy of mind to this point.  
An attempt to reconcile a view of the mind that decentralizes representation with a 
feature of human experience that by all accounts seems to be representational in nature could 
reveal interesting features both about embodied cognition as it has been defined and studied, and 
additionally have implications for the nature of language in our daily lives. Due to the 
spontaneous aspect of many variations on embodied cognition,1 especially enactivism, this 
branch of philosophy of mind may also serve to explain automatized language expression. 
Embodied cognition and enactivism are commonly considered to have a basis in the 
phenomenological work of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Gallagher, 2017; Inkpin, 
2017), meaning that such a line of investigation is not only empirically tenable, but aligned with 
phenomenological literature of the last hundred years.  Phenomenology of language is extremely 
compatible with embodied approaches and can provide important insights about the nature of 
                                                 
1 These variations are referred to collectively as 4e; ecological, embedded, extended and enacted 
(Gallagher, 2017). These variations are everchanging and many philosophers of mind do not fall firmly 
into one camp or another, causing more dispute regarding these divisions. For a more complete discussion 
of these variations, see Gallagher 2017.  
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language (Inkpin, 2017). This project attempts to address what we mean when we talk about 
second-language use and acquisition. 
Enactivists attempt to create a more coherent approach to the problem of content and 
mentality, especially with regards to responsiveness and spontaneity. Contrary to popular 
interpretation, the enactivist rejection of content in the majority of cognition does not lead to a 
total rejection of representation as “some cognitive activity– plausibly that associated with and 
dependent upon the mastery of language surely involves content” (Hutto & Myin, 2012, p. xviii). 
From this is does not follow that all of cognition or all mental processes necessarily involve 
content. The radical enactivist approach rejects the principle that content necessarily involves 
cognition, keeping content constrained to specific contexts like language.  
Rather than working from the view that content and representation are involved in most 
of cognition and from there explaining exceptions, Hutto and Myin approach the problem from 
the other direction by explaining how most basic processes work without representation, and 
from there allowing for exceptions (p. 4). This approach is due to the fact that it is possible to 
account for representation in specific contexts for a mind that does not depend on representation, 
but it is not possible to account for action in a computationalist system due to the number of 
concepts and degrees of rapid customization that are necessary (2012). Enactivism focuses on 
understanding these processes as dynamic interactions with the environment in which a concrete 
division between in the mind and outside of it is not possible due to the “patterns of 
simultaneous, reciprocal causation [that] occur among the environments, the brain and the body” 
(p. 6). These interactions are grounded in and best explained by nothing more and nothing less 
than that same organism’s prior interactions with the environment at hand (p. 8).  
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The enactivist dismissal of the traditional understanding of representation comes from a 
rejection of naturalistic accounts for informational content of thought (p. 36). The main issue 
with content necessarily involving cognition is that there is not a sufficient naturalistic 
explanation that allows for this assumption to be made due to the problem of conflating 
information-as-covariance with information-as-content (p. 67). Simply put, the fact something 
transmits information about something else is not sufficient for there to be truth-bearing content 
involved (p. 67).  If and when our cognition relates information about something, it does not 
necessarily follow that said cognition has content. Rather, many cognitive processes can be 
understood adequately as directed intentionality in response to one’s environment (p. 82). In a 
similar vein, cognition is not confined to the brain and representation, but exists in action across 
the brain, body and world in a social and intersubjective context (Gallagher, 2017, p. 6).  
Natural languages and cultural background fulfill the role of representation when 
necessary (Hutto & Myin, 2012, p.  41).  According to Clark and Chalmers, natural languages act 
as a complement to our inner state and extend cognition to the use of external representations 
(1998, p. 13, quoted in Hutto & Myin, 2012, p. 147).  Their argument is dependent upon the 
distinction between a basic mind and a scaffolded mind. While the basic mind lacks content, the 
scaffolded mind can make use of linguistic representation as a shared external representation, 
and as a vehicle for what is meaningful semantic content. Language is explicitly and clearly to be 
understood as a tool in the enactivist framework, an idea that largely dismisses the traditional 
delineation between one’s internal and external life. As such, mental processes that are 
traditionally considered to be representational are extensions of the same intersubjective, action-
based and embodied processes that characterize less obviously representational aspects of the 
human experience.  
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This goes against the traditional cognitivist line of thinking in which these less obviously 
representational activities (that for instance don’t make use of language) are in fact 
representationalist in their entirety. There are many philosophically interesting implications of 
such a radical questioning, one of which includes the foundations of intentionality as the mark of 
the mental (Gallagher, 2017, p. 66). Although this work cannot entirely avoid the issue of 
intentionality and the nature of mentality, it will not be addressed at length in the course of this 
investigation. For phenomenologists like Inkpin, phenomenology of language can clarify and 
illuminate what we mean when discussing scaffolding and mentality (2017), and so this project 
hopes to in part address such questions if only partially. 
This will have interesting implications for the process of acquiring a second language, 
which should work in terms of acquiring a new system of external intersubjective and shared 
symbols (Hutto & Myin, 2012, p. 152). The enactivist view of language as presented by Hutto 
and Myin is additionally a decidedly social view, and likewise an evaluation of the acquisition 
process can be decidedly social as well.  Due to the holistic take on the experience, changes in 
such a system would imply changes to other parts of the system. Gallagher writes of system 
components “at the very least a removal (or an addition) of any component will entail 
compensatory adjustments across the system” (p. 11-12). It then stands to reason that a 
consideration of language, particularly an experience with language that involves acquiring a 
new representational system would be one such example of adding a new component. The 
possibilities of cultural learning can imply an adaptability to human cognition and behavior (p. 
46).  
Furthermore, relatively recent trends in philosophy of language and neurolinguistics, such 
as Lakoff and Johnson 2003 and Pulvermüller 2005 support a view of language that considers 
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“body-related simulations (representations) as important for language and content processing” 
(Gallagher, 2017, p. 4). These views may not be entirely enactivist in nature, as they tend to 
include more appeals to classically cognitivist views of the mind, but even so they do indicate a 
shift in methodology and default viewpoint to one in which embodiment is a more thoroughly 
considered aspect of the lived-experience of language in recognition of the “embodied roots of 
abstract thought” (p. 38). Even if dubious of the enactivist approach to cognition, 
phenomenology of second language acquisition has significant implications for other peripheral 
research programs.  
Through a marriage of phenomenological and investigation based in cognitive science, an 
enactivist approach to the process of second language acquisition can provide insight to 
philosophical questions regarding the mark of the mental, the nature of language, and the role of 
responsiveness for the human being. In taking an embodied, and especially enactivist, look at 
language, representation in language in decentralized to instead consider language as an 
intersubjective and shared scaffolding. Furthermore, second language acquisition (SLA) 
becomes the responsive acquisition of such a system, rather than mere representation. From this 
place, we can consider key SLA theories to amplify the investigation in a more interdisciplinary 
way.   
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Chapter 2b: Background Theories 
Having laid forth much of the philosophical background necessary for this project, it is 
necessary to do the same for the linguistic aspects at hand. Upon defining some key terms and 
theories in SLA, the linguistic and scientific accounts of language acquisition can be used as a 
basis for a solid phenomenological account. There are many approaches to understanding SLA, 
one of the primary ones being a skill acquisition-based approach. The skill acquisition-based 
approach is one that is less fully based on a cognitive model and tends to consider a more social 
and enacted context. A second theory that can offer some illumination as well is the sociocultural 
theory of SLA.  
This skill-based approach is somewhat more applicable to situations where the learner is 
being exposed to explicit rules in a more controlled setting, due to its focus on the 
proceduralization process (DeKeyser, 2007, p.103). Proceduralization is the process by which 
the declarative knowledge of the language is translated into expressive use of the language (or a 
transition from knowledge-that to knowledge-how). Regardless of some of its limitations in 
application, it is helpful in predicting student output, and accurately describes a model for how 
student’s acquisition can vary with regard to certain features of grammar (p.108). This process is 
thought to end in automaticity, in which fast, unstoppable processing occurs regardless of the 
amount of information presented and elements key to understanding are obvious (Segalowitz, 
2003, p. 390). Segalowitz explains the process in a more detail by stating that  
[proceduralization] involves passing from a cognitive stage where rules are explicit, 
through an associative stage where rules are applied repeatedly in a consistent manner, to 
an autonomous stage where the rules are no longer explicit and are executed 
automatically… automaticity, then, describes an end point in the acquisition of skill in 
this model (2003, p. 395). 
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The specific variation on proceduralization that Segalowitz has presented is the Atomic 
Components of Thought (ACT) theory, but he also states that there are other general cognitive 
skill development theories, noting specifically Newell’s Soar theory (especially natural language 
Soar). These theories have not been explicitly applied to SLA, although some theorists make 
references to ACT theory (p. 395). Chapter 4, which will speak to various models of skill 
acquisition, will outline Soar theory as an example of ACT theory more thoroughly.  
The process of SLA cannot be merely a question of the declarative knowledge becoming 
procedural knowledge, as the student needs to retain some amount of the knowledge-that in order 
to flexibly acquire more knowledge-how and prevent such issues as fossilization (Johnson, 1996, 
quoted in Segalowitz, 2003, p. 395). Fossilization refers to an advanced student’s errors 
becoming entrenched in their speech despite their exposure to correct speech and explanations as 
to why what they are saying is wrong. Likewise, there may be issues when it comes to 
generalizing from knowledge-how to knowledge how without use of the knowledge-that which is 
the basis for the knowledge-how (DeKeyser, 2001, quoted in Segalowitz, 2003, p. 396). This 
proceduralization can be optimized since the student needs the appropriate declarative 
knowledge and examples through which the use of the rule can become clear (DeKeyser, 2007, 
p. 100). To give a specific example, an ESL student learning the difference between the articles a 
and an needs, in the skill acquisition model, to have the proper initial explanation of the 
difference and many examples through which he can eventually gain a procedural take on the 
difference and use it in his own writing and speech. Of course, any error in the initial explanation 
or in the practicing of the rule could lead to pretty bad fossilization, but this just shows how easy 
it can be to learn a language incorrectly.  
SLA is an especially mysterious process if one considers that  
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even though many learners fail to achieve complete mastery of a target language, there is 
still a ‘logical’ problem of SLA [abbreviation mine] …learners eventually know more 
about the language than they could reasonably have learned if they had to depend entirely 
on the input they are exposed to (Lightbrown, 2006, p. 35).  
 
This overstepping is made more intriguing by the fact that it is not confined to those that achieve 
mastery of a language, but rather is applicable to a wide variety of learners. This idea of the 
logical problem of language acquisition is not as readily visible with regards to other types of 
skills, since an individual who suddenly shows more expertise than is easily explained in doing a 
certain task may have achieved a certain break-through based on the input they have received. 
This may be less commonly seen when dealing with other types of skill, including cognitive 
skills, from baseball to chess, but it appears to be actively built into the process of SLA.  
The sociocultural theory (SCT) of SLA provides another, but not incompatible account, 
for other aspects of the SLA process. Rather than initially assuming that language is a cognitive 
skill, “SCT [abbreviation mine] argues that human mental functioning is fundamentally a 
mediated process that is organized by cultural artifacts, activities and concepts…Language use, 
organization and structure are the primary means of mediation” (Lantolf &Thorne, 2007, p. 201). 
This view places the acquisition of language in terms of a manipulation of symbols that are to 
some degree external and is for this reason more compatible with the enactivist view of language 
as scaffolding or as tool manipulation. This tool-based process at its most basic level occurs 
through one’s interaction with one’s environment, and the ability to manipulated said tools 
changes one’s social environment and one’s self (p. 203).  
One of the key aspects of SLA that SCT attempts to describe is the aspect of internalizing 
the language through private speech, or “appropriat[ing] the patterns and meanings of this speech 
and utiliz[ing] it inwardly to mediate our mental activity” (p. 206). Through processes such as 
this one we gain the ability to regulate ourselves in our second language expression (p. 203). In 
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this theory, the individual and his ability to internalize the language is fundamentally social and 
“emerges from social interaction” (p. 218), making no part of the language learning process 
either passive or incidental (p. 218). The SCT approach, in addition to the skill acquisition 
approach, are both amenable to an enactivist view of both cognition and language.  
There are a number of other linguistic background concepts helpful for understanding this 
investigation, namely mentalese, linguistic relativity, and universal grammar. Mentalese refers to 
Fodor’s hypothesis that there is some type of language of thought that is translated into our 
natural language (Aydede, 2010). Such a view of language and thought would mean accepting 
representationalist accounts of the mind to be true and would also imply that it is the same 
process to learn a first language and a second language. It would be the case that in each 
circumstance we are translating directly from our mentalese into natural language.  
However, certain views of linguistic relativity (which can take the form of either 
linguistic determinism or linguistic influence) demonstrate that upon one’s learning of a first 
language, one does not learn a system into which one translates one’s thoughts, but rather learns 
the categories and ideas with which one from then on interprets the world. Linguistic 
determinism, or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, specifically attempted to note that “thinking is 
affected by the grammar of the language” (Hudson, 1996, p. 96). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is 
generally interpreted as being primarily an explanation of the influence of grammar on thought, 
and not merely the influence of vocabulary on thought. Regardless, the influence of vocabulary 
on thought is also worth exploring in its own right.  
To give an example of the impact of vocabulary on one’s phenomenological experience, 
perception of color is shown to be influenced by one’s language. Winawer et al (2007) studied 
the impact of Russian words for the color blue on perception of colors. The Russian language has 
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two words for blue; siniy, or dark blue; and goluboy, or light blue. Before the tests, the subjects 
were asked to evaluate where on a scale of shades of blue they would place the siniy-goluboy 
distinction or the dark blue-light blue distinction, depending on their language. Both sets of 
speakers placed the distinction at the same place. This indicates that whatever difference there 
may be in active perception, it is a difference in the strength of the categories, and not that light 
is being processed differently or that their perception is physically altered in some other way.  
The subjects were given three color blocks, and they had to say which of the two on the 
bottom row matched the block on the top row. They could see all three blue blocks at the same 
time to avoid testing memory and language, so that the test focused on perceiving the blocks. 
The discrimination of shades of blue had a different linguistic distinction in Russian that did not 
exist in English, meaning that Winawer et al predicted that Russian speakers would more quickly 
make cross-category decisions (2007), that is, decisions involving siniy and goluboy blocks. At 
no point did the English-speaking subjects have an advantage in the cross-category comparison 
(2007). The impact for Russian speakers was even more pronounced when cross-category colors 
that were very similar were being compared. This cross-category advantage along with the fact 
that both sets of speakers gave very similar sets of blue for each word demonstrates that,  
the critical difference in this case is not that English speakers cannot distinguish between 
light and dark blues, but rather that Russian speakers cannot avoid distinguishing them: 
they must do so to speak Russian in a conventional manner (Winawer, 2007, p. 7783).  
 
This distinction is more habitual and automatic than it is for the English speaker (Winawer, 
2007, p. 7784).  
This advantage for the Russian speaker was still the case when the subjects had to 
remember an unrelated spatial pattern during the task, but interestingly was no longer the case 
when they were asked to repeat a string of numbers to themselves during the task. The difference 
in performance when verbal interference was involved indicates that this habitual distinction is 
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employed during the task without the subject necessarily being aware and does not indicate that 
these linguistic differences change the structure of perception itself (p. 7784). One can argue that 
if the use of Russian during one’s life actually led to a physically different perception of the 
color blue, the advantage would have remained during the linguistic interference task.  
The issue at hand with regard to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, is not only the question of 
vocabulary, but the question of grammar. They were not the first to suggest the influence of 
natural language on thought. W.V. Humboldt is often considered one of their intellectual 
precursors (Al-Sheikh Hussein, 2012; Heidegger, 1971) when it comes to how language shapes a 
society’s worldview. Regardless, their formulations are perhaps the most widely known 
variations on linguistic relativity, and so the hypothesis bears their names. 
One of the issues with the original hypothesis is that it is unclear to what degree Sapir 
and Whorf wanted to say that language affected thought. Certain readings state that it is one key 
factor (linguistic relativity), while others state that they thought it to be the most central one 
(linguistic determinism). As Al-Sheikh Hussein (2012) writes, this is due to the Whorf’s 
reformulation of the hypothesis later on in his career (p. 642). Sapir’s original hypothesis, based 
on his work in languages indigenous to the Americas, is that one’s language influences one’s 
perception of the world, and that “the existence of many languages systems implies that the 
people who think in these different languages must perceive the world differently” (p. 642). 
Whorf extended Sapir’s ideas and according to Al-Sheikh Hussein, “went much further than 
saying that there was a ‘predisposition’; in Whorf’s view, the relationship between language and 
culture was a deterministic one” (p. 643). Whorf’s application of the hypothesis also extends to 
features of grammar instead of merely categories that are reflected in the vocabulary. Al-Sheikh 
Hussein finds that this aspect of the hypothesis indicates more linguistic influence on the way 
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one thinks “since classification systems that belong to sex, number, time, are both more subtle 
[sic] and more pervasive” (p. 643).  
Al-Sheikh Hussein also argues that Whorf’s view of linguistic relativity implies that there 
is no objective reality. He writes that,   
Sapir did not doubt the existence of an objective world. He said that human beings do not 
live in the objective world alone, but that the real world is, to a large extent, 
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. Whorf stated that the world is 
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by the 
linguistic system in our minds. This would seem to make the objective world into 
something totally subjective for Whorf (p. 643). 
 
 This idea of having either objectivity or total subjectivity in either version of the hypothesis 
seems somewhat absolutist as it is possible to consider that both linguists were perspectivists. 
There is little reason to conclude that Sapir’s view of language led him to an objective 
understanding of reality while Whorf’s led him to a subjectivist view. Another issue with such a 
statement is that it has proved very difficult to empirically test or falsify. Many find that a hard 
version of language determinism would make it impossible for us to reflect about our own 
language, and also impossible to learn a different one, and so a softer version of their hypothesis, 
linguistic relativity, is more widely accepted.  
 When speaking of linguistic relativity, especially in a philosophical and 
phenomenological treatment of the subject, it is impossible to avoid considering Wittgenstein’s 
apparent endorsement of linguistic relativity, represented in his famous aphorism, “the limits of 
my language (of that language which I alone understand) mean the limits of my world” (1961, 
5.61, quoted in Williams 1974). Misquotations of this aphorism that eliminate the parenthetical 
phrase are rampant among endorsers of linguistic relativity, and such misquotations dismiss a 
caveat of this influential aphorism. The implications of the phrase “of that language which I 
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alone understand” are unclear.2 A potential interpretation of this aphorism leads us to a view of 
language as a private language, which later Wittgenstein dismisses in favor of  “language being 
an embodied, this-worldly, concrete social activity, expressive of human needs, as opposed to the 
largely timeless, unlocated and impersonal designatings of the Tractatus” (Williams, 1974, p. 
79), which may not entirely rid Wittgenstein of his idealistic and relativistic tendencies (see 
footnote #2).  
There is a crucial difference between what we may call Whorf’s linguistic relativism and 
Wittgenstein’s linguistic relativism. The most crucial of these is the conception of language in 
which the two thinkers operate. Whorf is speaking of language in a narrow sense, more or less 
following a folk definition of language as a social good and artifact that heavily influences 
world-view, while Wittgenstein speaks quite directly of language as world-view (p. 86). What he 
is willing to define as an aspect of language goes well beyond what a linguist or social scientist 
such as Whorf may consider, to the extent in one thought experiment he includes color samples 
as an artifact of language (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 11). It is also important to note that 
Wittgenstein’s linguistic relativism might in fact encourage us to think outside our world-view 
and enjoy what new perspectives we may find. Williams writes that,  
Thus, the different world-pictures, as so far introduced [in later Wittgenstein], are not 
inaccessible to one another; those who had one picture might come to see the point (in 
terms of interests, etc.) of another picture, and also perhaps come to understand why 
those who had it did so (p. 87).  
 
Perhaps this implication is also unavoidable in Whorfian relativism. To the extent we can 
imagine these alternatives outside our native language through another, it would seem that we 
should engage in such imagination.  
                                                 
2 For a treatment of the idealist, solipsist and relativist consequences of the Tractatus, consult Williams 
1974.  
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A third aspect that should be discussed in a treatment of SLA is the question of universal 
grammar. Chomsky’s universal grammar (1977) refers to a number of structures that are 
common to every language, and therefore thought to be common to how humans think. Such 
structures include verbs being altered in some way to fit the subject and negation (VanPatten, 
2017a). These grammar structures are not the surface grammar that is discussed when one learns 
how to write in a grammatically correct way but are thought to refer to more internalized 
structures that all or most languages have in common (VanPatten 2017b). The main advantage to 
such an understanding of the human mind is that it helps us account for the logical problem of 
language acquisition by allowing us to deduce patterns about how our target language works in 
terms of this system of internalized rules. Unfortunately, like linguistic relativity, it is somewhat 
difficult to design an experiment than can test for the hypothesis of universal grammar and not 
inadvertently confirm or reject some other hypothesis. It may be difficult to eliminate factors 
such as a student’s broader pattern recognition abilities, or their ability to extrapolate more 
explicitly from structures in their first language. In general, universal grammar is related to many 
significant philosophical questions regarding philosophy of language and of mind, but unlike 
mentalese and linguistic relativity, universal grammar is less helpful in determining a 
phenomenology of second language acquisition, and so it will be not be extensively addressed in 
the course of this project.  
When we look at second language acquisition as a cognitive skill, most accounts will 
emphasize the proceduralization and automatization of the skill. Considered in a more social 
context, accounts should prioritize the interactions of many speakers and the internalization of a 
particular way of understanding reality when acquiring a language. These new priorities recast 
language as a dynamic and responsive mediation with reality, rather than as mere representation. 
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In this light, mentalese is effectively disregarded due to its overly representationalist bent. 
Questions of linguistic relativity are open ended and key to an exploration of what it is to move 
between languages and between cultures. Finally, universal grammar should be considered as 
extraneous to an investigation that attempts to deal with language acquisition as a lived process. 
The nature of proceduralizing or internalizing a way of doing things, key to the description of 
SLA in this chapter, fundamentally hinges on epistemological issues regarding the knowledge-
that and knowledge-how distinction, and so this is an appropriate moment for such a distinction 
to be addressed.
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Chapter 3: Techne and Episteme 
The concept of proceduralization calls to mind another distinction in philosophy, that of 
episteme (knowledge-that) and techne (knowledge-how). While there are maybe some cases in 
which we more or less easily distinguish between the two types of knowledge, many skills, 
especially cognitive skills, are not easily placed in either category. Language in particular might 
be seen as bridging or subverting this distinction in a unique way. The episteme-techne 
distinction has been by no means treated universally across the history of philosophy, indicating 
that it is not an obvious or necessary way to understand knowledge. There are many instances in 
which philosophers have attempted to question this distinction or eliminate it altogether, by 
either stating that knowledge-how is a variation of knowledge-that, or that knowledge-that is a 
variation of knowledge-how. Establishing an approach to this distinction in helpful for 
understanding the phenomenology of SLA, as it is a process often explained in terms of 
proceduralization, conventionally described as a shifting from knowledge-that to knowledge-
how.  
One solution to the problem of classifying language acquisition as either knowledge-how 
or knowledge-that is to dismiss the distinction. Practicalism3 is the position that it is possible to 
account for knowledge-that in terms of knowledge-how (Fantl, 2012). Instead of understanding 
knowledge as justified true belief, this position accepts other ways to “manifest knowledge-that” 
(Fantl, 2012). Knowledge of p being the case can instead be understood as the capacity “to 
respond, to reply, to represent or to reason accurately that p” (Hetherington, 2006, p.77, quoted 
in Fantl, 2012). The primacy of knowledge-how is echoed in enactivism, where prior interactions 
                                                 
3 This position is also called radical anti-intellectualism. Since this phrase may be confused with a 
sociopolitical worldview, the term “practicalism” will be used instead. 
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with an environment lead to further interactions without internal representation (Hutto & Myin, 
2012, p. 8). If we consider that knowledge-that is actually a form of knowledge-how, the 
problem of proceduralization in SLA is much less of a problem. Instead of being a transition 
from knowledge-that to knowledge-how, proceduralization then becomes a transition from the 
ability to express a certain grammatical rule or definition, to the ability to express oneself. This 
practicalist view of skill acquisition would still provide an account for first-language acquisition 
as the acquisition of the ability to express oneself. Aside from the ability difference in types of 
knowledge-how, SLA and first-language acquisition would be to a large extent, similar 
processes. SCT is also compatible with the practicalist approach to skill acquisition since both 
processes highlight responsiveness in a given context.  
Collins (2004), in contrast, highlights the division between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that as well, in favor of what he refers to as an informalist approach. In contrast, 
Collins defines formalism as the belief that we can represent tacit (or informal) knowledge in 
terms of rules, while informalists do not think tacit knowledge is reducible in this way (p. 125). 
He states that there are certain ways in which knowledge-that does not encapsulate aspects of 
experience, stating that “informalists tend to think that those who believe otherwise have 
mistaken propositional knowledge– that which can be said about a domain– with real 
understanding” (p. 126). The implication of this quotation is not only that there is a key 
difference between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, but furthermore that knowledge-how is 
in some sense superior to knowledge-that. In this sense, the process of proceduralization would 
involve the acquisition of this real understanding.  
Informalism, unlike practicalism, would imply a difference between first-language 
acquisition and SLA. The native speaker of English has this procedural knowledge of how to 
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speak English, or as Collins writes, has real understanding. The language learner, on the other 
hand, needs to gain this propositional knowledge and then at some point gain this real 
understanding of the language. It may be possible to frame this idea of real understanding of a 
language in terms of either automaticity and proceduralization, or internalization of the language, 
or both. However, the native speaker is always, or is in most circumstances, the one who 
possesses the real understanding of the language. The myriad of instances in which a non-native 
speaker has more expressive ability than a native speaker (especially within certain social 
contexts) may imply that there are ways and circumstances in which a non-native speaker is the 
one with the real understanding.  
While a normative projection onto second-language acquisition may at times be 
unsavory, it is unavoidable. Excellence in any field, and excellence in the acquisition of any 
skill, should be a part of any strong account of such topics. If anything, the practicalist emphasis 
on the primacy of knowledge-how permits both a consistent view of the nature of knowledge and 
allows language to be unique in its knowledge-how state as an act of appropriation. The 
practicalist epistemological approach is consistent in that it does not incorporate what must be 
considered a largely arbitrary distinction between these types of knowledge. Much of an accurate 
description of knowledge-how includes knowledge-that. Much of an accurate description of 
knowledge-that includes knowledge-how, indicating that the distinction is often arbitrary and 
therefore potentially not reflective of the nature of knowledge. This prevents the need to create 
an entirely separate second type of knowledge, when it seems to be that the primacy of 
knowledge-how can adequately explain knowledge-that, and additionally accounts for the 
appearance of difference between these types of knowledge. The informalist approach justifiably 
demonstrates a reluctance to reduce knowledge-how to knowledge-that, and yet this unity may 
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be more acceptable if it is knowledge-that that is being categorized as knowledge-how. The cases 
of knowledge that we may term knowledge-that are in fact cases in which there is content to an 
instance of knowledge-how. In this way, practicalist and informalist views are compatible. 
Given the practicalist emphasis on the expression of whatever knowledge is at hand, or 
the ability to “to respond, to reply, to represent or to reason accurately that p” (Hetherington, 
2006, p.77, quoted in Fantl, 2012), language and one’s manipulation of a language also become 
indispensable as it is in some way key to most instances of response, reply, representation and 
reasoning. The informalist conception of real understanding is also quite related to one’s ability 
to manipulate a language and the internalization of this scaffolded representational system. What 
will henceforth be termed an informal practicalist approach gives a consistent epistemological 
approach compatible with enactivism. Furthermore, such an informalist and practicalist approach 
echoes the primacy of operative intentionality accepted by many enactivists (Gallagher, 2017, p. 
80).  
The knowledge-that and knowledge-how distinction is assumed in many philosophical 
and linguistic circles and is how we often try to understand such processes as proceduralization. 
But this distinction is by no means consistent across the history of philosophy, meaning that we 
can question this categorization. While taking an enactivist point of departure, practicalism is 
highly amenable to an investigation regarding language acquisition for the priority it gives to 
knowledge-how. This is furthered by an informalist approach, which would go slightly further by 
placing greater epistemological importance on knowledge-how. An informal practicalism 
addresses the epistemological distinction while remaining consistent with phenomenological and 
enactivist approaches. With such importance placed on knowledge-how, the acquisition of a 
techne, or a skill, should be more thoroughly evaluated. Dreyfus’ various models for 
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understanding skill acquisition present key debates in phenomenology and, together with more 
social and affective models, illuminate an understanding of language acquisition and use as 
embodied and responsive.  
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Chapter 4: Dreyfus: Skill Acquisition and 
Success 
Now that we have established a practicalist and informalist approach to knowledge which 
prioritizes knowledge-how (techne), we can approach the acquisition of a new language as the 
acquisition of a skill. When appraising this process from a cognitive skill basis, Dreyfus’ 1980 
five-stage model of skill acquisition and Soar theory, commonly referenced in skill acquisition 
and second language acquisition literature respectively will be appraised. Since we can also 
consider language an embodied and social skill, other models such as Dreyfus’s skillful coping 
(2002), Barnacle’s gut learning (2009), and Collins’ linguistic socialization (2004) and Hutto et 
al’s cultural permeation (forthcoming) will be considered. By considering these various models, 
which evaluate cognitive, social and affective factors, we can begin to reach a varied enactivist 
account of some aspects of language acquisition.    
The Dreyfus five-stage model of skill acquisition, created by brothers Hubert and Stuart 
Dreyfus, established a commonly referenced and accepted framework for understanding skill 
acquisition to the present day. For this reason, it offers a helpful initial stage from which an 
adjusted model may emerge. Their 1980 article is additionally interesting for the subject at hand 
due to the authors’ attempts to use the model they were creating when discussing language 
learning.  The first stage, or the novice stage, involves said novice finding “context-free features 
which the beginner can recognize without the benefit of experience…the beginner is then given 
rules for determining an action on the basis of these features” (p. 7).  
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At the competence level, the student has developed an idea of the guidelines, or 
“experience-based meaningful elements” (Dreyfus, 1980, p. 8). Here the authors seem to allow 
for the possibility of comprehension and meaning. They acquire a certain sense of guiding 
principles to make some predictions of future applications. At the proficient stage,  
the brain-state correlated with the performer’s experiencing a whole situation from a 
particular perspective is organized and stored in such a way as to provide a basis for 
future recognition of similar situations viewed from similar perspectives (Dreyfus, 1980, 
p. 10).  
 
At the expertise level, intuition becomes apparent in the student’s approach.  
This five-stage model of skill acquisition implies a linear shift from abstract rules to 
concrete responses, which may not entirely be the case in the context of language learning. 
Language learning as a process is not easily divided up into stages. VanPatten (2017a) puts forth 
that language learning as a process is piecemeal and involves working on pieces of all parts of 
the language at once. Tense, gender, case endings and use of more complicated phrasing are all 
pieces that develop in conjunction with each other, which does not follow the current popular 
model wherein language is taught one aspect at a time (VanPatten, 2017a). A student doesn’t 
master a particular type of conjugation and then move on to another type; rather the student 
learns pieces of various grammatical structures at the same time. For this reason, a stage-based 
structure may not capture the immense variation in one student’s language ability at any given 
time. This five-stage model, then, may be more accurately seen as a way to explain 
automatization and proceduralization.  
The matter of measuring automatization is quite difficult, as it tends to focus in on 
specific performative and testable factors of language production. One such factor that is 
frequently used as a metric for automatization is processing speed, which can be somewhat 
problematic. As Segalowitz writes, “while all automatic processing may entail fast processing, it 
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does not follow that all fast processing is necessarily automatic…merely observing that 
performance was fast does not necessarily indicate it was automatic” (2003, p. 385). 
Furthermore, as DeKeyser explains,  
Automaticity is not an all-or-northing affair. Even highly automatized behaviors are not 
100% automatic, as becomes clear when we stumble walking down the stairs, when we 
realize we are driving too fast when engaged in an exciting conversation with a 
passenger, or when we stumble over our words while uttering a simple sentence in our 
native language (2007, p. 99). 
 
This problem of a seemingly random failure during a task that should come easily is also referred 
to as choking. The aspect of choking in and of itself is an interesting subject in the realm of 
philosophy of skill acquisition and cognitive science, with much work done on the topic, 
including Ilundáin-Agurruza 2015, which focuses on the experience as it applies to sport. In 
choking, an individual with the necessary expertise to perform the task severely underperforms 
(Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2015, p. 398).  
Intuition in general is a rather poorly defined term in many contexts, and so it can be that 
Dreyfus’ use implies the automatization of expression in the target language, but it can also be 
argued that the authors attempt to make a point about the proceduralization of knowledge, which 
is supported by their statement that “without his consciously using any rules, situations simply 
elicit from him appropriate linguistic responses” (Dreyfus, 1980, p. 12). This implies a certain 
leap from knowledge-that to knowledge-how, or barring that distinction, a certain automatization 
of responses. The final stage of mastery involves a state in which the learner “cease[s] to pay 
attention to his performance (Dreyfus, 1980, p. 14).  
The cautious reader should resist this notion that the speaker ceases to pay attention at a 
masterful level. While basic sentences clearly do not demand the mental effort that they once 
did, a master in an important sense is perhaps more deeply aware of the conventions and rules 
they are manipulating. This is a common critique of early Dreyfus as well as late Dreyfus’ 
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skillful coping model (to be explained in more detail later in the chapter), although late Dreyfus 
does seem to treat the question of what we are paying attention to with a little more nuance than 
early Dreyfus. Regardless, many are concerned, perhaps justifiably, that his statements about 
mindlessness and being unaware of certain steps in a process implies a lack of intelligent doing. 
Inkpin, for instance, characterizes Dreyfus’s understanding of skill acquisition as one in which 
we are not aware and do not deliberate (2017, p. 274). While this is a component of some 
readings of Dreyfus, the mindlessness that both early and late Dreyfus emphasize is not a 
shorthand for unintelligent behavior, but rather emphasizes other factors like environment or 
goals (Gallagher, 2017, p. 192). Varied interpretations of Dreyfus aside, there is something to be 
said for accurately reflecting the role of attention in the phenomenology of skill acquisition. We 
should neither overemphasize or de-emphasize the role of paying attention.  
Gobet and Chassy (2009) raise a number of critiques to the five-stage model proposed 
above and then put forth their own model for skill acquisition. The first critique is that the five-
stage model depends on a transition from concrete situations to abstract understandings of the 
appropriate responses for a situation. They posit that there are some skills that may not include 
this transition from a concrete approach to an abstract approach and go even further in their 
critique by stating that there are some skills that develop in the opposite direction, which is to 
say, move from abstraction to concrete understanding. There example for this type of skill is 
physics “where experts in fact solve problems at a deep, abstract level, while novices perform 
at a superficial, concrete level (Chi et al. 1981; Larkin et al. 1980)” (Gobet & Chassy, 2009, p. 
7).  
Their second critique is that this linear progression for a skill does not account for 
variations of ability in the various sub-fields within a skill (p. 8). The variation for which the 
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authors want to account is particularly applicable to language learners whose skills in their target 
language vary wildly depending on the task that is being performed. The sub-fields aspect may 
be especially critical for language learning, as it is not necessarily possible to understand 
language learning as a series of separate tasks. Gobet and Chassy’s critiques can accurately be 
understood as problems with a unified skill theory as a whole. Their proposed response to the 
five-stage model is the Chunk Hierarchy and Retrieval Sequences (CHREST) model, wherein 
long-term memory serves as a template that short term memory interacts with to make decisions.  
The Soar theory, mentioned previously, is similar to CHREST in terms of short term and 
long-term memory interaction. This theory is commonly discussed in SLA literature, and should 
be evaluated as a potential component of an explanation of SLA. The most recent version of this 
theory of cognitive skill acquisition is Soar 9,4 which is explained in depth by Lehman et al 
(2006). Newell’s Soar theory is created with the goal of creating a unified theory of cognition for 
artificial intelligence, such that it would “be a set of computationally realizable mechanisms and 
structures that can answer all the ideas [they] might want to ask about cognitive behavior” (p. 2). 
The theory depends on a cognitive architecture, or a structure of fixed features of human 
cognition through which these cognitive behaviors are realized (p. 4). Although the functionalist 
paradigm is not aligned with the commitment to embodied cognition and decentralization of 
functionalist conception highlighted as my foundation, it could be helpful in putting forth other 
situated aspects of cognitive skill acquisition.  
One of the potential issues in the attempted theory is that it desires to account for a wide 
range of skills as cognitive behaviors. Among the cognitive behaviors that Lehman et al list, 
there are “reading a book…solving equations, cooking dinner, driving a car, telling a joke, or 
                                                 
4 It is unclear why the naming convention is this way, but in principle the addition of a number prevents 
confusion regarding different variations of Soar theory advocated by different students of Newell.  
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playing baseball” (p. 4). They note a number of qualities that are common to cognitive behaviors, 
and these may serve as potential qualities through which SLA as skill acquisition can be 
considered. These factors are  
(1) goal-orientation,  
(2) being situated in a rich environment,  
(3) using a large amount of knowledge-that,  
(4) using symbols and abstractions,  
(5) flexibility in response to the environment, and  
(6) learning from said environment (p. 4-5).  
All six of these features are tenable as features of the phenomenological experience. They are 
also, despite the underlying functionalist bent, compatible with an enactivist view of the mind as 
it exists through action and context. The enactivist emphasis on intersubjectivity and social 
context is largely missing from this model, which is unsurprising given its functionalist and 
cognitivist bias. More socially oriented looks at skill acquisition will be considered later on.   
Goal orientation is an important aspect to consider when looking at second language 
acquisition, as much of communication is oriented towards the completion of a specific message. 
Indeed, the proposed shift on input-based language acquisition currently considered in the field is 
primarily considered useful as the student needs to decipher some meaning or message from the 
input they are receiving (VanPatten, 2017a). Instead of being inundated with many rules to 
memorize and learn how to apply, having the concrete goal of understanding the text at hand is 
helpful in directing the student’s attention.  
Points (2), and (3) are quite clearly important when it comes to SLA. This “rich, complex 
and detailed environment” (p. 5) as highlighted by Lehman et al is one that we also navigate 
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when learning our first language. The situatedness can be even more complicated if we are 
learning a language in which new ways of categorizing reality exist. The use of an extensive 
amount of knowledge-that is also quite self-evident when it comes to one’s SLA. This 
knowledge-that can either refer to vocabulary, or grammatical rules. In the case of the 
vocabulary, this mental bank of words from which to pull is commonly referred to as a mental 
lexicon. A mental lexicon must be pretty substantially developed for the student to engage in 
meaningful exchange. To give one benchmark of what degree of a lexicon is required to draw 
meaning, students need to have the necessary vocabulary to understand 90% of a text if they are 
to be expected to learn new words through what they see in that text (Segalowitz, 2003, p. 309). 
This is merely one way in which it is possible to see the extensive amount of knowledge-that on 
which expression builds itself.  
With regards to point (4), the authors make the claim that we “represent the world 
internally using symbols, we can create abstractions” (Lehman, 2006, p. 5). The degree to which 
we represent the world internally is certainly up for debate, but it does certainly seem that in 
manipulating a language in order to communicate, we are engaging in symbol manipulations and 
abstractions. The very nature of enactivism puts the idea of internal representations in doubt, 
since representation is a part of the extended or scaffolded minds and the very idea of internal 
and external worlds is dubious.  
Flexibility in response to the situation, point (5), is also quite clearly applicable to SLA. 
As Lehman et al describes, “human cognition isn’t just a matter of following a fixed plan, or of 
always thinking ahead, it’s also a matter of thinking in step with the world” (p. 5). It is this 
responsiveness and situatedness of communication and expression that make the automaticity 
and proceduralization aspects of the language difficult to obtain, as one is at first limited in the 
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ways in which one can express oneself. If the original intent is not understood, especially in an 
immersive context, there are few ways in which a beginning speaker could attempt to express 
their same need, and thus there is not the optimal flexibility to handle the situation. As to feature 
(6), learning from the environment and experience is clearly evident in the input and 
proceduralization concepts in SLA.  
A number of other features of Soar theory should be highlighted and considered in terms 
of SLA. They state that this cognitive model needs to help illustrate how one moves through 
problem space, which is the set of possibilities that arise from making a choice in that situation 
(Lehman, 2006, p. 8). Differences in the objects at hand in the situation create differences in the 
agent’s problem space. Problem space could serve as a useful representation for the process of 
producing text or speech in the target language, as there is a progressive series of possibilities 
from which one must pick. Newell’s original Soar theory, as well as Soar 9, assumes the 
principle of rationality, which they define as “if an agent has knowledge that an operator 
application will lead to one of its goals then the agent will select that operator” (Newell, 1972, 
quoted in Lehman 2006, p. 10). This principle may also be helpful when considering expression 
in the second language as a goal-driven activity. If a series of words do not produce the reaction 
nor the thing the speaker is seeking, she will use different ones until she gets her goals met. Once 
again, the problem of fossilization gives us pause as a learner who has fossilized problems is not 
communicating in the way that gives a successful result or results in successful communication 
but is rather communicating in the way that they have become accustomed to despite their 
knowing better. These six key factors of a skill will be integrated to a phenomenological account 
in Chapter 6. Although it is a heavily functionalist approach, it is not incompatible with 
phenomenological and enactivist discussions.  
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As has been the case with other understandings of skill seen in Dreyfus and CHREST, 
Lehman et al do assume that procedural knowledge is the principle aspect of cognitive behaviors, 
and that declarative or episodic knowledge only enters in the situation when the procedural 
knowledge in not adequate (2006, p. 14). This is aligned with the general position taken in this 
examination regarding the primacy of knowledge-how. Between Dreyfus’ 1980 five-stage model 
and the six skill features of Soar 9, it is possible to consider that skill acquisition is a process that 
occurs within and in response to a rich environment and context through which the learner 
develops intuitive responses.  
The theories that have been considered up to this point are all oriented towards thinking 
of language as a cognitive skill. It is also possible to consider language as a social skill and not 
merely as a cognitive one, which may offer other insights, as suggested by SCT. Language in 
such a context may offer a better understanding of the processes involved in implicit rule 
learning, not easily accounted for in proceduralization (DeKeyser, 2007, p. 103). However, this 
issue with proceduralization could be due to DeKeyser’s conflation of cognitive skill acquisition 
and skill acquisition more generally (p. 104). Dreyfus’s later work in skillful coping, while not 
constituting a total break from the 1980 model, offers a more socially motivated and 
environmentally aware look at skill acquisition.   
Dreyfus’ skillful coping (2002) offers a non-representationalist account for learning and 
skill acquisition with the use of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of intentional arc and maximal grip that 
places the actor in relationship to his environment. The intentional arc is  
the tight connection between the agent and the world, viz. that as the agent acquires 
skills, these skills are ‘stored,’ not as representations in the mind, but as more and more 
refined disposition to respond to more and more refined perceptions of the current 
situation (Dreyfus, 2002, p.1).  
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This idea corresponds with the abstract to concrete transition present in the five-stage model of 
skill acquisition, and yet as Dreyfus states, it does mark an attempt to explain the process in a 
non-representational way. The use of “refined” above does not necessarily only imply an abstract 
to concrete shift in skill acquisition but could possibly demonstrate a concrete to abstract shift as 
well in such cases where an abstract understanding of the situation is more appropriately 
responsive to what is going on than a concrete understanding.  
One key aspect of this intentional arc idea is that the skill exists as a response of the 
person performing the skill to their environment, and yet it is important to not think of this 
responsiveness as an input-output oriented feedback loop. The agent is in much closer dialogue 
with his environment such that we cannot say where he ends, and his environment begins.  This 
is an especially interesting aspect when considering skills with an obviously social aspect, such 
as second language acquisition, or even dance. In such skills, this responsiveness occurs within 
the community and within the present situation. SCT also considers the speaker in the context of 
his present social situation, noting that cognition arises from this situation. The key to this 
development of selective responses as it is understood by Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus is that 
representation of the end stage, or of doing the task well, is not necessary in order to be directed 
toward the goal.  
Through this intentional arc, the learner attempts to achieve maximal grip, which for 
Dreyfus is “the body’s tendency to respond to these solicitations in such a way as to bring the 
current situation closer to the agent’s sense of an optimal gestalt” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 1). The 
learner is driven by the situation in which they find themselves to strive for a sort of homeostasis 
with that situation as  
Finite, involved, embodied coping beings are constantly ‘motivated’ to move so as to 
achieve the best possible grip on the world…acting is experienced as a steady flow of 
skillful activity in response to one’s sense of the situation (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 234).  
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While the traditional understanding of intelligence and skill-acquisition is based on a trial-and-
error approach in which successful actions are repeated and unsuccessful actions are eliminated, 
the maximal grip understanding is dynamic and gives us a view in which the learner is striving 
for an action which improves the situation towards the purpose at hand rather than fulfilling a 
certain static goal (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 241). The difference between skillful coping and a trial-
and-error view lies primarily in that we have taken a radically different stance on what 
constitutes a mind which has not left us much room for internal representation nor for easily 
drawn distinctions between the self and the world. Rather than the trial-and-error view in which 
the agent makes attempts and then adapts their attempts based on the input they receive from the 
world around them, this is a view in which the environment and the self are not easily 
distinguished such that the agent is constantly adjusting.   
In many situations, and with respect to many skills, there is not one ‘right’ way to do the 
task, but perhaps a variety of better ways. This dynamic process towards maximal grip depends 
on exploration of alternative approaches in order to understand the continuum of these superior 
and inferior ways (Dreyfus, 2004, p. 243), and in moving towards an expertise, the need for such 
exploration is gradually less necessary as the learner knows an optimal or superior approach to 
the situation more readily. This isn’t to imply that the expert does not experiment, as many 
experts may still innovate through experimentation (Wrathall, 2014, p. 11), but rather that 
experimentation in order to achieve maximal grip is no longer strictly necessary.  
Intentional arc and maximal grip provide interesting, non-representationalist accounts for 
certain features of second language acquisition. They explain purposiveness in such a way that 
representation of the end goal is no longer necessary to explain a skill. When someone is 
learning to beat eggs, for instance, they are not necessarily operating with a representation of 
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what they are aiming for and judging the difference between what they produce and what they 
wanted to. Likewise, a chess student is not comparing his chess game to a grandmaster chess 
match during play. Both learners are attempting to beat the eggs or play the game well enough 
based on their sense of the situation.  
Since initial stages in skill acquisition for Dreyfus often include some amount of 
representation and abstract rules, the beginners may judge their grip on things based on such 
features, but this may not be a representation of the end goal. To return to the chess match, if the 
learner is assigning point values to pieces (abstract rules) rather than intuiting certain responses 
to the opponent (concrete response), he still may not be representing to himself a perfect chess 
match, to a large extent because he probably wouldn’t know what one looked like. Even 
watching someone else beat an egg only tells us so much about what that process is. We may 
know what the physical end stage looks like and have an idea of the optimal viscosity, but angle 
and speed are achieved for the learner through repetition and experimentation, not through 
abstract ideas. Simply put, the learner experiments and in doing so engages with his world 
towards better but not necessarily right ways of doing the task because he has no way of 
knowing what success as a static moment looks like. He has no idea (and no representation of) 
what he is doing. A differential continuum, rather than a series of rigid dichotomies, is aligned 
with a knowledge-how approach to cognition, action, and language, considering knowledge-how 
is often a matter of degree (Ryle, 1949, p. 59; Inkpin, 2017, p. 216).   
Just as a chess student is unlikely to have a mental representation of the best way to play 
the game, a language student is also unlikely to have a mental representation of the best way to 
say what they are trying to say. While the student may not have a concrete and static notion of 
how they maybe should say what they are going to say, a sufficiently advanced student would be 
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basing their decisions on prior encounters with the language to move towards maximal grip at 
that moment. The dynamic nature of the intentional arc and movement towards maximal grip is 
particularly visible in dyadic instances wherein a direct response to one’s companion. Such 
instances include, among other practices, chess playing, tennis, sword-fighting, one-on-one 
formal debate and conversation. This last example is of course the most pertinent to second-
language acquisition discussion.  
The language student, without being able to represent and achieve a perfect utterance, is 
instead in the situation of the chess student, wherein experimentation is necessary. It is extremely 
unlikely that she would have heard the original utterance that she wants to express before, 
barring some basic commonly used phrase. It is necessary for the student to pick the better of the 
available options and adjust according to the subsequent situation. In this way the student must in 
the process of attempting to converse navigate concerns of grammar, word choice, tone, body 
language, gesture and content. Certain signs from her interlocutor, such as a change in facial 
expression that indicate whether or not her utterance was understood, may alter her perception of 
the situation so that she finds she is moving towards maximal grip or away from it. 
Experimentation in these utterances pushes the learner to fine-tune what she is trying to convey 
to move towards maximal grip. While with chess we may see a linear decline in experimentation 
as certain responses become normal for the player, the rate of experimentation for a language 
learner may vary during the process. In the beginning stages when a learner has limited 
vocabulary and grammar, there is little room for experimentation, as there is for a chess player 
who can only move certain pieces. Later on, when the student is exposed, through target 
language exposure or formal instruction, to more grammatical structures and vocabulary, there 
will be more room to experiment.  
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During the student’s progress through more advanced stages, there may be more 
experimentation with regards to word choice, and less with regards to grammar, as certain errors 
become more obvious to the student, or the implications of certain types of verb conjugations are 
more obvious. Eventually, the automatized production of language in response to the 
interlocutor, with approximately the same immediacy and grammatical perfection as one’s native 
language, happens with little to no experimentation. A sense of what feels right, or sounds right, 
may be the appropriate way for a language learner to approach the situation, and if they have 
learned to self-regulate their language productions sufficiently, they are showing the 
internalization of the target language as described in sociocultural theories of second language 
acquisition. Such auto-regulation is often considered a measurement of a more adept language 
speaker as well. Likewise, affective perceptions of the conversation incorrectly or correctly 
influence the learner’s perspective of the conversation, steering further language choices.  
Aside from auto-regulation and understanding of one’s interlocutor, maximal grip in a 
language acquisition context is rooted in the ability to express. Expression has often been treated 
philosophically as the natural result of thought, such that this expression serves as one of the 
only ways to know what an agent has thought (Inkpin, 2017, p. 98). For Merleau-Ponty, thought 
bends toward language as musical abilities bend towards performance (2002, p. 31, quoted in 
Inkpin, 2017, p. 98). Through this same intentional arc, thought can bend towards expression 
with representation of the end stage.  
 One of the more interesting philosophical consequences of the intentional arc and 
maximal grip approach to skill acquisition and second language acquisition is that it 
fundamentally diminishes the significance of rules in expert behavior.5 This echoes the 
                                                 
5 A secondary implication to the application of the intentional arc to language production is a 
reexamination of the potential gap between what is said and what is meant by a speaker (Wittgenstein, 
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practicalist view indicated previously, but the consequences of this for the fields of philosophy of 
mind and second language acquisition are easily underestimated. If this is indeed a 
phenomenologically, philosophically and empirically tenable explanation for skill acquisition 
then, “[the learner] is doing just what Feigenbaum feared he might be doing—recognizing 
thousands of special cases” (Dreyfus, 1985, p. 36). As previously noted, this possibility indicated 
our status as embodied and embedded creatures in a Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontian sense, 
and the primacy of knowledge-that in the form of conception and representation is dubitable. As 
far as its consequences for second language acquisition, such a knowledge-how orientation 
would to a large extent dismiss the poverty-of-the-stimulus motivated argument for universal 
grammar.  
Chomsky’s universal grammar (1977) refers to a number of structures that are common 
to every language, and therefore thought to be common to how humans think. Such structures 
include verbs being altered in some way to fit the subject and negation (VanPatten, 2017a). 
These grammar structures are not the surface grammar that is discussed when one learns how to 
write in a grammatically correct way, but rather are thought to refer to more internalized 
structures that all languages have in common (VanPatten 2017b). Such a system of internalized, 
unconscious rules is commonly referred to as a response to the logical problem of language 
acquisition, wherein “learners eventually know more about the language than they could 
reasonably have learned if they had to depend entirely on the input they are exposed to” 
(Lightbrown, 2006, p. 35). Learners often produce certain statements that are not entirely 
traceable to the input they have received from the language. Whereas a knowledge-that centered 
view of the mind makes it impossible to show such spontaneity without some structure like 
                                                 
2009, p. 12). A speaker may not have some secondary representation of what they mean to say in mind 
(so to speak) when they fail to say what they meant.   
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universal grammar. On the other hand, if we can learn how to do something without a 
representation of what we are learning how to do, in a nearly perpetual state of adjustment and 
experimentation, we really do show a tremendous amount of special case knowledge, accrued 
through the intentional arc.  
After all, a tennis player needs to adapt to the particularities of their opponent and 
respond to their shots based on past experiences with other opponents. The impressiveness of 
responsiveness and difficulty of generalization does not cause us to assume that we have innate 
pattern recognition abilities for tennis shots. The remarkable abilities we show as regards 
language learning can reflect that languages are a feature of our shared world in a 
Wittgensteinian sense. As Coope writes, “It is a curious fact of life that human languages are 
translatable” (1974, p. 261). Hopefully it is obvious that stating that all human languages are 
translatable does not mean that such translation is direct or easy. Despite overly dramatic 
statements about foreign terms that cannot be translated, there are precious few instances in 
which a term really cannot be translated and this compatibility between human languages should 
not be surprising at all. The central commonality of human languages is that they are spoken by 
humans, and so of course they are going to reflect similar common-sense aspects of reality. 
Subject-verb agreement, for instance, makes sense when we live in a world wherein actions 
originate from actors. When we consider the common-sense aspects of reality that are reflected 
in universal grammar, it is a possibility that these features are not engrained in the human mind’s 
approach to language, but rather reflective of very basic commonalities to human experience.  
Knowledge-how does not exist in the form of accessed representation, but rather is 
perpetually in response to our situatedness. To return to Dreyfus’s example of the chess player,  
a careful description of the phenomenon suggests that, while beginners learn to 
distinguish specific patterns and follow rules for how to respond to them, the chess 
master, by playing thousands of games, has refined his dispositions to respond 
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appropriately to each situation, and these changing dispositions to respond are correlated 
with changing lines of force on the board, which in turn solicit appropriate responses. So 
there is no need for the expert to remember or in any way store a repertoire of 50,000 
typical positions (2004, p. 239).  
 
While it may be a stretch to say that language goes un-stored in exactly the same way, the role of 
immediacy and aptness of response is significant to second-language acquisition considerations. 
This role of responsiveness and adaptability to one’s environment is significant to consistent 
theories of knowledge and approaches to the mind. If this responsiveness, or intentional arc, 
based in a fundamental unity with one’s surroundings in considered, the problem of an end goal 
in conversation becomes, rather than the expression of a specific point, a fluid process towards 
maximal grip. Affect and social context, then, become indispensable tools in this navigation. 
 Barnacle (2009) echoes Dreyfus’ emphasis on learning as a process that occurs socially 
through norms and institutional rules (p. 23), and so attempts to decentralize reason from its 
current place in education (p. 21). This leads her to a view of the acquisition of knowledge that 
attempts to more readily cross traditional mind-body divisions and accept the body as an integral 
part of the learning process. Her view of this process seems to maintain some degree of possible 
mind-body divisions, perhaps along the lines of functionalist embodied cognition wherein the 
body has a certain role in the inputs, outputs and representation that is occurring in the mind. Her 
goal is bridging this dualistic gap in the process of education, but she does this primarily through 
a focus on the role of the “gut” in one’s interaction with the world and one’s sense-making, or 
hunches (p. 24). The degree to which a phenomenologically experienced physiological response 
may be involved in a reflective sense of one’s own knowledge is certainly an interesting topic, 
but Barnacle fails to account for the potential cross-cultural issues in asserting that we experience 
the world through our ‘minds’ and guts. Regardless, her description of this process as interaction 
and embodied endorses a knowledge-how based approach to learning itself, as well as an 
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emphasis on the role of interpretation in this approach (Kalantis and Martin, 2006, quoted in 
Barnacle, 2009, p. 26).  
Once again, the representation using to non-representation using shift implies that it is the 
case for all skills, and, simply put, it may be the case that some skills involve a more complicated 
dynamic between non-representationalist and representationalist approaches. Even in an 
enactivist approach, one should be cautious about positing a universal transition away from 
representation, especially since representation is a significant aspect of the scaffolded mind. We 
should be open to social skill models that demonstrate an interaction between non-
representationalist and representationalist processes. Despite the problems involved in creating a 
universal approach to skill acquisition, and some of the potential cultural biases in Barnacles’ 
presentation, the intuition angle presented through gut-learning is a valuable component and a 
factor through which skillful coping is achieved. This further underscores the role of context and 
affect in skills such as SLA.  
Through skillful coping, we can further consider the more directly social aspects of 
language acquisition. Collins (2004) in particular presents language acquisition as a more social 
type of skill. His analysis is not done in terms of second language acquisition per say and is more 
focused on what he terms “linguistic socialization” (p. 127) in terms of learning the specific 
vocabulary of an area of expertise, such as a field of science, and in terms of people with atypical 
embodied experience needing to adapt the language of their community. His explanation for the 
acquisition of vocabulary in a specific field is rather straight forward, but his idea of linguistic 
socialization in terms of people who live in the same community but have varying embodied 
experiences. This concept of acquiring a language depends on two theses; the social embodiment 
thesis and the individual embodiment thesis. His social embodiment thesis states that “the 
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language developed by a society is related to the bodily form of its members because bodily form 
affects the things it can do,” (p. 130), while the individual embodiment thesis is that the 
“language of a community whose members are embodied in one way can be acquired by 
individuals with different shaped bodies and who cannot participate in the activities of that 
community” (p. 130).  
While this particular argument for an idea of linguistic socialization involves an emphasis 
on disability, these embodiment theses demonstrate language acquisition as a social process that 
cannot be reduced to representations and depends on exposure to the language as it is used in an 
embodied and enacted way. This is particularly valuable in the context of language, since there is 
no meaningful private language. Meaningful languages exist in context and in intersubjective 
spaces. In this context the particular individual does not struggle to adopt the literal and 
idiomatic language use of their linguistic community despite the differences in their embodied 
experience. Mastering a language is interactional, and in interacting, the individual must have 
something to say. The intersubjective nature of language and language acquisition in this context 
leads us to the role that culture has in an enactivist view of the mind.  
One such model, proposed in Hutto et al (forthcoming), proposes an enactivist take on the 
cognitive penetrability thesis that emphasizes the role of these intersubjective, cultural factors by 
taking these same factors to be included in cognition. Hutto et al support  
 
 
the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, such that 
cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather than there 
being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted confines of 
cognition (p. 6).  
 
The authors further specify that the specific routines and practices an individual grows up with 
ultimately are influential to that individual’s cognitive capacities, scaffolding and intuition (p. 
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15). Ultimately the cultural permeation hypothesis is much like linguistic socialization, but it 
emphasizes how such practices and socialization come to constitute a key aspect of the 
individual’s environment and context, which according to enactivist tenets (and the tenets of 
extended cognition) is after all not separable from the mind of the individual. Changes across the 
environment or the brain result in changes across an entire system in this view; a metaplastic 
process (Gallagher, 2017, p. 209).  
Taken altogether, these varied models of skill acquisition, from both cognitive and social 
angles, can provide a solid initial phenomenological account of SLA. With inspiration from the 
Dreyfus five-stage model of skill acquisition (1980), we can appreciate that this process for the 
speaker constitutes a general shift from using abstract rules to concrete responses. This shift is 
general in that the speaker may often continue using some number of abstract rules while 
progressing, and indeed may even do so more adeptly as they continue learning. In many cases 
this will mean that a more advanced speaker is not consciously doing some of the steps that 
previously occupied his attention. For instance, the speaker may find that they “automatically” 
produce the proper plural conjugation, rather than inadvertently producing a singular 
conjugation. This lack of awareness regarding certain steps should not be interpreted as a total 
lack of awareness of what they are doing as a speaker. Not having the experience of consciously 
conjugating a verb does not mean that the speaker is completely unaware of producing a 
sentence. The student may also experience that certain aspects of the language come more easily 
than others, resulting in an unevenness. Their learning process is primarily one of developing 
knowledge-how, which happens in a rich goal-oriented environment in which the individual 
learns from said environment. This learning, even when it uses the abstractions and symbols of 
language, is not entirely representation-dependent due to the intersubjective and social factors. 
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Instead of representing the end goal of their speech to themselves, the speaker must seek the 
optimal responses in each moment to achieve maximal grip. In this process, repetition and 
experimentation develop what might be called an instinctual sense of appropriate responses. This 
process cuts across arbitrary brain-body divisions, since this instinctual sense may be 
phenomenologically experienced through the gut. The process is reflective of an intersubjective 
linguistic community, in which more than the individual’s embodied experience is considered, 
and ultimately takes cultural factors as inseparable from cognitive ones during this socialization 
process. Coping skillfully in and through social contexts is an indispensable aspect of 
Heideggerian phenomenology, which also serves as the intellectual backdrop to both Dreyfus’ 
philosophy and enactivism more broadly. An exploration of his treatment of skill acquisition and 
language is helpful in arriving at a more thorough enactivist account.  
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Chapter 5: Heideggerian Disclosure and 
Attunement 
Heideggerian phenomenology underlies the prioritization of skill throughout this 
investigation, and especially underlies Dreyfus’ skillful coping. For this reason, a consideration 
of language and skill in Heidegger is relevant in understand the philosophical issues at hand. 
Through understanding a Heideggerian approach to the human being and to language, we 
encounter a deeper understanding of our fundamental relationship with language, and what we 
are talking about when we talk about language as a skill. Heideggerian phenomenology espouses 
an interesting analysis of the relationship between one’s interpretation of meaning in the world 
and one’s interpretation of language. After explaining this relationship, we can apply 
Heidegger’s own terminology regarding tools to many of our own experiences with language. 
Throughout much of his work, language is considered as a key feature of the given context of a 
Dasein.  
Dasein is for Heidegger a term that encapsulates what it is to be a human being. It is 
literally rendered as “Being-there,” but can also be translated as “Being-then,” and in this way 
we can see that a human being is for Heidegger an entity which exists at a given place and given 
time, in a given context outside of their control. For Heidegger we are thrown into this context 
(Geworfenheit).  Language is a part of this context, and a part of how we interpret and 
understand said context. Heidegger explains in On the Way to Language (1971) that,  
In order to be who [sic] we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the 
being of language, and [sic] can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else. 
Thus, we always see the nature of language only to the extent to which language itself 
has us in view, has appropriated us to itself. That we cannot know the nature of 
language– know it according to the traditional concept of knowledge defined in terms of 
cognition as representation– is not a defect, however, but rather an advantage by which 
we are favored with a special realm, that realm where we, who are needed and used to 
speak language, dwell as mortals (p. 134). 
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In Heidegger’s view, the hidden nature of language is intertwined with human existence such 
that it cannot be understood independently, and this intertwined nature is a positive aspect of our 
relationship with language. This intertwined status means that it is necessary to engage in some 
novel process that shocks our relationship with language, causing us to think outside of the 
categories we are used to (p. 93). That proximity to a feature of experience inhibits full 
understanding of that experience is frequently referenced in Heideggerian philosophy, so 
language is not unique in this way. In seeking atypical experiences, we hope to break out of our 
usual relationship and understand language differently.  
For Heidegger, poetry is an especially valuable path to such an experience (p. 93), 
although there is room based on his understanding of linguistic relativity, to consider second-
language acquisition an appropriately shocking experience with language. Inkpin also hints at the 
value of this experience when reflected on his own journey into becoming interested with the 
philosophy of language after teaching English in East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and his struggles in rapidly adapting to his new environment and language (2017, p. 1). 
Language permeates a good deal of everyday experience, meaning that human beings ultimately 
do hear a foreign language as a series of “unintelligible words and not a multiplicity of tone-
data” (1962, p. 207). We do not really experience even the strangest of foreign languages as 
alien, as there is some commonality of lived experience between us and the speakers of that 
language.  
In addition, the revelatory potential of experiences outside of one’s own culture and 
language could also bring with it a reassessment and subsequent appreciation of cultural tradition 
that Heidegger himself seems to encourage. Heidegger writes that Dasein is rooted in a certain 
  53 
cultural tradition that can often shape or dictate its potential. The way to perhaps avoid some of 
this limitation is through a more reflective understanding of one’s own traditions and context.  
The elemental historicity of Dasein may remain hidden from Dasein itself. But there is a 
way by which it can be discovered and given proper attention. Dasein can discover 
tradition, preserve it, and study it explicitly. The discovery of tradition and the disclosure 
of what it ‘transmits’ and how this is transmitted, can be taken hold of as a task in its own 
right (Heidegger, 1962, p. 41). 
.  
Aside from broadening our linguistic horizons, the language experiences we are exploring also 
require a reassessment of one’s cultural context.  
In seeking out a non-default experience with language, be it poetry, literature, or 
language learning, we are also seeking out some time of non-default or reflective experience 
with our tradition and context. It should hopefully be clear that despite some of the benefits 
associated with intercultural exchange or reflection on one’s own cultural tradition and heritage, 
these benefits by no means necessarily arise from these practices in all cases. Heidegger’s own 
life demonstrates the error in assuming that morality necessarily occurs among the highly 
educated and elite. Regardless, the value of learning from one’s own intellectual tradition is 
frequently referenced in many works of existential phenomenology (see Arendt 1958), and it 
seems reasonable to interpret that certain intercultural exchanges can ultimately contribute to a 
more complete engagement with one’s own culture, hopefully to the enrichment of Dasein.  
The value of this type of intercultural experience is particularly evident in “A Dialogue 
on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” (1953) in which the contrasting German and 
Japanese understandings of the role of language is discussed. Much of the dialogue focuses on 
Heidegger’s previous esoteric and by his own account poorly defined6 statement that “Language 
is the house of Being.” This metaphor of a house is used throughout the dialogue both in 
                                                 
6 “I called language, clumsily enough, the house of Being” (p. 5). 
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reference to issues of linguistic relativity, and how language encapsulates our reality. These two 
topics are of course quite interrelated. Heidegger and Tezuka conclude the dialogue with a 
discussion of the Japanese word for language, which is kotoba. According to Tezuka, this word 
is a combination of the word for a moment of grace, and the word for a blossom or a petal, and 
so the very word for language is a flowering of graceful moments,7 quite different from the 
standard European fallback on words that literally mean tongue (p. 45-47). Heidegger’s own 
later philosophy of language is influenced by this intercultural understanding of the nature of a 
language.  
As seen in “The Nature of Language” (1957) the production of language in particular is 
infused with a poetic sensibility and is an act of creation of meaning.  
When the word is called the mouth’s flower and its blossom, we hear the sound of 
language rising like the earth … From Saying in which it comes to pass that World is 
made to appear. The sound rings out in the resounding assembly call which, open to the 
Open, makes World appear in all things. The sounding of the voice is then no longer only 
of the order of physical organs. It is released now from the perspective of the 
physiological-physical explanation in terms of purely phonetic data. The sound of 
language, its earthyness [sic] is held with the harmony that attunes the regions of the 
world’s structure, playing them in chorus (p. 101). 
 
Here, the very etymology of kotoba as presented by Tezuka to Heidegger is echoed in his poetic 
understanding of language. Language, more than representation for Heidegger, is an act of 
musical expression and creation. 
 This trend in his later writing fits well with much of his philosophy as he presents in 
Being and Time. While language is not one of its main focuses (perhaps to its detriment), there 
are certain sections and passages that reveal a commonly accepted interpretation of his 
                                                 
7 It is unclear to what extent Tezuka was a student of Japanese etymology, and to what extent he may 
have been engaging in a sort of ‘folk etymologizing.’ Nevertheless, he communicated a poetic image 
regarding the nature of language in Japanese that clearly influenced Heidegger’s other writing on the 
subject.  
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philosophy of language, that of the disclosive function of language (Inkpin, 2017).  The main 
role of Rede (most often rendered as “discourse”) is to direct our attention to the truths that we 
cannot access via our senses or rational abilities (p. 67), meaning that discourse has a significant 
role in disclosure. Disclosure for Heidegger is constituted in one’s laying out or revealing a 
certain state of affairs to be a certain way. His concept is fundamentally based in the literal 
translation of the Greek aletheia as “unhiddenness”, rather than as truth (Dahlstrom, 2014; 
Heidegger, 1962, p. 261).  
  In directing our attention to these specific features through linguistic articulation, certain 
meanings are given to the world around us. Truth for Heidegger is not confined to language but 
is a concealed feature of reality revealed through our attunement (Stimm) as much as through our 
rational understanding (Inwood, 1999, p. 13). By saying that Dasein interacts with his world 
through both affective non-cognitive approaches and rational understanding, Heideggerian 
phenomenology is considered amenable to, if not an intellectual predecessor of, embodied 
cognition. This view of language as disclosure may be easily misinterpreted due to its surface 
similarities with the ostensive view of language normally attributed to St. Augustine 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, p. 5).8 This view states that language’s principle function is to point out 
objects or features of reality. The disclosure-based view, in contrast, does not claim that speakers 
are pointing out features of the world through language, but are rather revealing these features.  
Disclosure bridges the gap between language and the world, such that there is no 
meaningful philosophical distinction between one’s grasp of language and one’s grasp of the 
world (Inkpin, 2017, p. 65). Many of the ways in which I seek unhiddeness with others depend 
on the use of language to go about revealing certain features of reality. As we will see with the 
                                                 
8 There is some ambiguity about whether or not St. Augustine actually proposed such a view of language. 
For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s interpretation of St. Augustine, see Kenny 1974. 
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modes of attunement below, the role of language during certain types of engagement is not clear. 
Furthermore, there is no easy distinction between the disclosure of the world and the disclosure 
of the self (Heidegger, 1962, p. 205; Arendt, 1958, p. 179). I am not merely a Dasein, but also a 
Mitsein, or a Being-with-Others. When I disclose the world, I disclose something about how I 
see the world, and in doing so disclose something about my own context. I disclose my world 
and myself to these others, and they do the same to me.  
The disclosive function of language, eschews an internal-external approach to philosophy 
of mind and philosophy of language. Heidegger maintains that “in talking, Dasein expresses 
itself not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something ‘internal’ over and 
against something outside, but because as Being-in-the-world it is already ‘outside’ when it 
understands” (1962, p. 205). I express myself through speech, not in the sense of bringing my 
internal representations out into the world, but in the sense of already being drawn out into the 
world outside of myself when I apply language to my surroundings. In the previously used 
enactivist vernacular, through use of a shared linguistic scaffold, I am expressed outside of 
myself. 
In engaging with the world, the self and the world are no longer separate and so no longer 
expressed in modular ways. This shift leads to a shift in the nature of communication.  
Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or 
wishes from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with [Mitsein] 
is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse 
Being-with [Mitsein] becomes ‘explicitly’ shared… (p. 205). 
  
To reiterate once again, expression is not bringing one’s internal representations out into the 
world, but rather an engagement with a shared system of representations. Communication is for 
Heidegger the act of making explicit the understandings I already have with those around me by 
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virtue of being Mitsein. In this way, with others and through attunement and language “makes 
World appear in all things” (Heidegger, 1957, p. 101).  
It is in this shared context that we cope with and navigate our reality. Heideggerian 
terminology regarding tool usage demonstrates the various senses in which Dasein engages 
reality (modes of attunement), and from this terminology we can extrapolate to understand 
Dasein’s experiences with language itself. Zuhandenheit, or “ready-to-hand-ness” is one of the 
key one of the philosophical underpinnings for much of Dreyfus’ work, as well as enactivist 
work. As previously discussed, Heidegger does not think that the human being encounters fixed 
and static things, but rather finds that the human being understands the things around him in 
terms of their potential. This idea is one of the most well-developed points of Being and Time 
and is rooted in Husserl’s notion of ability influencing cognition (Gallagher, 2017, p. 5).  In a 
direct dealing with an object,  
where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which 
is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at 
the hammer-Thing [sic], and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial 
does or relationship to it become and the more unveiledly [sic] is it encountered as that 
which it is– as equipment (Heidegger, 1962, p. 98).  
 
The qualities of the hammer are disclosed in our use of the hammer, and in our experience of the 
hammer as an active component of our surroundings, not as a static object. To encounter a piece 
of equipment as a for-which is to experience something as ready-to-hand. In other words, when 
we are using a hammer, we do not experience it as a hammer but rather as something with which 
we perform the action of hammering to reach certain ends.  
There are however ways that we interact with equipment that differ from readiness-to-
hand. We can also encounter a piece of equipment in a present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) or 
unready-to-hand state. Encountering something as present-at-hand happens for Heidegger 
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when Dasein engages in, for example, the practices of natural science, when sensing 
takes place purely in the service of reflective or philosophical contemplation, or when 
philosophers claim to have identified certain context-free metaphysical building blocks of 
the universe (e.g., points of pure extension, monads), the entities under study are 
phenomenologically removed from the settings of everyday equipmental practice and are 
thereby revealed as fully fledged independent objects, that is, as the bearers of certain 
context-general determinate or measurable properties (size in metres, weight in kilos etc.) 
(Wheeler, 2011).  
 
The hammer is present-at-hand not when we use it, but when we attempt to reflect about 
the hammer in a metaphysical or scientific sense. When this equipment is broken in some way 
(relatively hard to do with a hammer),  
[the] equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand 
equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand…The more urgently we need what is 
missing, and the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the 
more obtrusive does that which is ready-to-hand become– so much so, indeed that it 
seems to lose its character of readiness-to-hand (p. 103).  
 
When I am hammering and the hammer breaks, my attention is shifted from my goal in 
hammering and my towards-which experience of the hammer to one in which the hammer is the 
object of my attention. In these contexts, we encounter the world anew, either in the sense of un-
readiness-to-hand, or in the sense of present-at-hand objects and our environment (p. 105). This 
uncanny experience brings us to a certain different or new understanding of the world. This 
echoes the previously discussed Heideggerian mandate to seek out uncanny and shocking 
language experiences. If we extrapolate from the experiences that we have with equipment to 
those we have with language, a varied phenomenology of language that explores a wide range of 
linguistic ability for speakers is possible and philosophically useful. Countless philosophers and 
philosophical stances referenced during this examination have frequently considered language as 
a type of tool, and so the extension of the analysis of these experiences is promising.  
We can begin to evaluate this experience with readiness-to-hand. An utterance can be 
understood primarily as a “for-which” just as a piece of equipment can. The native speaker, in 
most everyday contexts, rarely is directing attention to the sentence itself, but rather to the 
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situation in which they find themselves and their purpose in this situation. Likewise, a non-native 
speaker who can successfully automatize and proceduralize their expression of the language may 
not direct their attention to their utterances frequently. A speaker who is still lacking proficiency 
may find that the typical tool they have used to engage in a shared reality is lacking in some way 
when they are pushed into a situation using a language with which they have less proficiency. In 
this way, the utterance which works like a hammer for the native speaker is broken. At a 
rudimentary level of language learning, a new word or expression is present-at-hand, without a 
for-which through which the student can wield it, but also without the sudden lack of normal 
potential that one experiences when an utterance fails. The present-at-hand word or phrase is 
encountered in without context and so present to Dasein in the way that an object that is being 
contemplated philosophically is. 
In this way and through these varied encounters with language, the individual’s ability to 
grasp language and grasp the subsequent world is dynamic. Through the learning process, we 
move from a present-at-hand encounter with the language to a ready-to-hand encounter, with 
numerous moments of un-ready-to-hand-ness along the way. The intentional arc is the 
negotiation through these encounters with the language in all its minutiae to arrive at a maximal 
grip in the situation. As discussed in the previous section, maximal grip is not best thought of as 
an end state, but rather as a process of constant negotiation. Similarly, ready-to-hand-ness is 
precarious and can perpetually fall back into un-ready-to-hand-ness or present-at-hand-ness. In 
this way, excellence in second language acquisition is understood once more as fundamentally a 
dynamic and non-linear process.  This interaction happens through various modes of engagement 
with our world and language, and in this process, we reveal the world to ourselves and others.
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Chapter 6: Towards a Phenomenology of 
Second Language Acquisition  
 Although philosophy of mind and philosophy of language have traditionally be 
understood in a representationalist and rule-based way, trends in phenomenology of language 
and embodied cognition promote an exploration of the mind and language in a responsive and 
lived context. Second language acquisition in particular serves as an example of an atypical 
phenomenological experience of language that could be seen in this responsive light. Through 
these trends, it is possible to account for second language acquisition in a way that decentralizes 
the representation and rules and sees second language acquisition as a type of skill acquisition 
that is primarily responsive and that informs a way of interacting with the world. 
 Chapters 2a and 2b established the necessary background regarding key debates and 
concepts in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and second language acquisition. 
Embodied cognition approaches, such as enactivism, allow for an understanding of intelligent 
human behavior that is not confined to representation manipulation. A new way of understanding 
this intelligence offers a new angle on the problems of proceduralization and automatization, 
wherein SLA is understood as a certain type of skill acquisition that involves knowledge-that and 
knowledge-how. Alongside this understanding of SLA, we must also consider such linguistic 
concepts as linguistic influence, universal grammar, and sociocultural theory to resituate 
language as we experience it. Chapter 3 investigates some of the philosophical implications of 
separating knowledge-that and knowledge-how, ultimately adopting an informally practicalist 
approach, where knowledge-how is irreducible to knowledge-that, and knowledge-that is an 
instance of knowledge how. This again allows our conception of SLA to be compatible with an 
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enactivist approach and decentralizes concepts such as content and representation. Chapter 4 
explores a variety of cognitive and social skill accounts of language, ultimately pairing Dreyfus’ 
skillful coping with a variety of more explicitly social takes on language use. In this way, we can 
begin to posit a new phenomenological account for these types of language experiences. Chapter 
5 investigates the Heideggerian influence on enactivism and Dreyfus, especially when it comes 
to his philosophy of language and his account of attunement and disclosure, allowing this 
phenomenological account to be situated in dialogue with various historical debates in 
philosophy, and broader metaphysical debates regarding human nature. 
 To lay out this phenomenological account, we will first review several key concepts in 
SLA, namely proceduralization and automatization. Proceduralization has been commonly 
understood as the process by which declarative knowledge (knowledge-that) becomes procedural 
knowledge (knowledge-how) (DeKeyser, 2007; Segalowitz, 2003). Automatization, both in SLA 
and in other phenomenological investigations, is a bit more difficult to define since it may imply 
a degree of mindlessness or lack of attention in doing the task. The controversy arises when we 
consider that the relationship between mindlessness, attention and intelligent action are by no 
means settled questions. Regardless, we can consider automaticity to involve some amount of 
rapidness or lack of prior reflection when doing the task (Segalowitz, 2003), which does not 
mean that it is unintelligent or mindless.  
It is overly simplistic to describe second language acquisition as merely proceduralizing 
and automatizing knowledge of the target language. The problem of fossilization, for one, 
demonstrates that there is some danger in getting stuck in certain habits, and that some amount of 
reflection and flexibility is necessary for expressing oneself well (Johnson, 1996). In addition, 
the logical problem of second language acquisition, wherein a non-advanced speaker knows 
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more about the vocabulary and grammar than is accounted for by their exposure to the language, 
indicates that there is something more to this process than a student learning and internalizing the 
material that has been put in front of them (Lightbrown, 2006).  Some of these factors are 
highlighted by a sociocultural theory (SCT) of SLA, wherein language acquisition is mediated by 
culture and artifacts, and is best understood as the adaptation and internalization of a system of 
representation used by others (Lantolf & Thorne, 2007).  
 One of the factors that can make understanding our experiences regarding language 
difficult is that it is so intertwined with how we interact with the world, and according to the 
research and writings of many linguists and philosophers, is perhaps the most influential factor in 
our experience of reality. Linguistic relativity, commonly called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
despite the fact that no one version of the hypothesis exists, broadly refers to the thesis that our 
language either heavily influences or determines how we see reality (Al-Sheikh Hussein, 2012). 
While many are doubtful regarding the stricter version of this hypothesis, linguistic influence has 
a good deal of scientific and philosophical support, depending on what you take to be language 
(Wittgenstein, 2019; Williams, 1974) and on what you take to be the most impactful feature of 
language (i.e. vocabulary or grammar) (Winawer, 2007). As highlighted, the important role of 
language in our daily lives and apprehension of reality makes atypical experiences with language 
more significant.  
 Setting aside the more cultural concerns like linguistic relativity, the debates over 
proceduralization highlight the philosophical distinction between knowledge-that (episteme) and 
knowledge-how (techne). This distinction varies throughout the history of philosophy and many 
examples demonstrate that these two types of knowledge are not nearly as separate as they seem 
to be. Practicalism (Hetherington, 2006; Fantl, 2012) takes knowledge-that to be a type of 
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knowledge-how due to the skills that are engaged in knowing and is amenable to an enactivist 
and skills-based approach to language acquisition. In a practicalist view, proceduralization is not 
reduced to a shift from knowledge-that to knowledge-how but is a change in someone’s 
knowledge-how. An informalist approach (Collins 2004) gives a certain priority to knowledge-
how as being real understanding. This helps prioritize the role of ability and responsiveness in 
language acquisition, despite largely questioning and diminishing the distinction between 
knowledge-that and knowledge-how.  
 It is in this context of current skills-based SLA research, linguistic relativity and 
epistemological questions that we can begin crafting an enactivist understanding of SLA.  
While there have been previous phenomenological inquiries into language (Inkpin, 2017), 
and many enactivist approaches to various types of skill acquisition, in this account, an enactivist 
approach to human nature and responsiveness is being used to resituate second language 
acquisition as fundamentally responsive and not representational. In doing so, I am using a 
variety of enactivst and enactivist-adjacent understandings of social interaction and skill 
acquisition, and explicitly applying these to the learning of a second language, a type of language 
experience that has received, at most, a cursory mention in the majority of philosophical texts. 
Questions regarding language are frequently not approached with an embodied or enactive 
framework, since these approaches tend to prioritize exploring non-representationalist activities, 
but, as I have been highlighting, it is possible to understand language in a way that decentralizes 
typical notions of representation. 
We can begin constructing this phenomenological account by overviewing the accounts 
that take language to be a cognitive skill. While the Dreyfus 1980 five-stage model of skill 
acquisition is frequently dismissed as being too linear, we can, broadly speaking agree that in 
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acquiring a language one moves to a more immediately responsive and less reflective state. 
Likewise, many of the features normally highlighted in Soar theory, are clearly compatible with 
a phenomenological look at this process, despite the former’s AI and functionalist origins. These 
features were, once again,  
(1) goal-orientation,  
(2) being situated in a rich environment,  
(3) using a large amount of knowledge-that,  
(4) using symbols and abstractions,  
(5) flexibility in response to the environment, and  
(6) learning from said environment (Lehman, 2006, p. 4-5).  
 Features (3) and (4) are prima facie out of place in an enactivist look, but still essential to 
this investigation. To reiterate, this work does not directly address such issues as intensionality 
and what may constitute the mark of the mental, and yet cannot entirely avoid discussing the 
roles that representation and rules may have in intelligent human activity.  Since we have 
adopted a practicalist standpoint, perhaps (3) would be reformulated as using abilities to express, 
reason and reply about a wide variety of facts and concerns as they relate to knowledge about the 
language, but also the cultural context. (4), the question of representation, is the central difficulty 
in philosophy of mind and enactivism and cannot be addressed comprehensively in the 
remaining pages. Since many enactivists use scaffolding to explain how a basic mind can use 
representation for certain processes such as language, and this scaffolding is a shared 
intersubjective external system, (4) can be happening in such a shared, intersubjective, and 
external system. This type of shared system is compatible with a Heideggerian take on 
expression as being the act of making explicit what is known between Mitsein.  
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Features (1), (2), (5) and (6) are clearly explained by the various social and affective 
models explained in Chapter 3. In skillfully coping (Dreyfus, 2002), the learner is moving 
towards better and more finely tuned responses to her situation, without necessarily representing 
to herself what she is doing or being aware of each step she is making in the decision-making 
process. We also can’t reduce this responsiveness to a matter of input and output, as this 
assumption overemphasizes a distinction between the actor and her environment that is not easily 
drawn. Skillful coping is a matter of constant adjustment for the speaker, such that she is 
constantly evaluating the information she is getting from her environment and interlocutor or 
interlocutors to navigate towards a more skilled responsiveness. While we must allow for more 
scientific inquiry about the nature of cognition, it is not necessary to use structures such as 
universal grammar to explain language learning since “[the learner] is doing just what 
Feigenbaum feared he might be doing—recognizing thousands of special cases” (Dreyfus, 1985, 
p. 36). 
We must be hesitant about over-rationalizing this process by sticking it away in the brain 
and consider that she is not only processing her environment in this way, but also in an affective 
sense through what her “gut” might be telling her (Barnacle, 2009). The role of the gut in 
learning is not uniform in all cultures or individuals, but broadly speaking refers to how the 
speaker may have a sense that the conversation is going well or poorly, or even that a phrase is 
grammatically correct or not, in a way that she cannot rationalize or explain. The situation or the 
utterance may simply sound right or feel right, and this sense is a piece of a complete vision of 
skillful coping that does not assume cognition or intelligent action is confined to the skull.  
Collins (2004) and Hutto et al (forthcoming) lay out certain features that help us further 
understanding language as a feature of interaction not confined to the private life of the 
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individual’s mind. Collins’ individual embodiment and social embodiment theses highlight how 
many people, especially those who have some type of disability, need to adopt a language and do 
adopt a language that reflects the embodied experience of their community more broadly in order 
to communicate, despite the fact that their experience may be remarkably different. Hutto et al 
(forthcoming) similarly proposes that cultural factors permeate thought process such that we 
cannot easily assume a separation. In both cases, the broader social context for the speaker is not 
only indispensable if we are to understand the process of SLA, or language use in general, but is 
a key factor in how the speaker herself approaches language, embodiment and communication. 
This responsive, affective and social process is metaplastic, such that changes across one aspect 
of the brain-body-world system require other adjustments to compensate.  
Considering the emphasis on responsiveness and skill, a Heideggerian phenomenology of 
language and phenomenology of skill serves as the unaddressed underpinning of much of the 
phenomenology done to this point, especially Dreyfus’ phenomenology and enactivism. While 
Merleau-Ponty is clearly another indisputable influence, Heideggerian phenomenology 
frequently addresses the issues of language, context and goal-orientation in a way that is more 
directly relevant to this topic of investigation. 
Heidegger appears to endorse seeking out unique and atypical language experiences in 
order to understand language and considers language a key aspect of disclosure (Inkpin, 2017; 
Dahlstrom, 2014) wherein through the speaker’s state as a Dasein and a Mitsein, she makes her 
understanding of the world explicit to others and they do the same to her (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
205). Furthermore, she herself is not separate from the world and language involved. In this 
sense, she is also continually disclosing herself. Expression is for Heidegger, consistent with the 
enactivist and socially oriented views presented, not an act of bringing out ideas from the private 
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mind into the world, but an act of making the understanding you’ve projected onto the world 
explicit (Heidegger, 1962). 
It is possible to gain more insight regarding varied first-person experiences of language 
through the application of Heidegger’s terminology regarding attunement (Stimm). An object 
may be ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) or experienced in an active way with the subject’s 
attention on the end goal of the use. Since language is quite commonly described as a tool, an 
utterance may be understood in the same way. It may become un-ready-to-hand, or broken in 
some way, such that the attention shifts from what the goal is to the object as an inconvenient 
barrier to the goal. Similarly, a mispronunciation or incorrect utterance can derail the goal of the 
speaker, drawing her attention to the language itself and her error or confusion. An object may be 
present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), or as it is when studied in some scientific or philosophical way 
outside of a lived or active context. Language may be similarly placed in such a context, such as 
when you look up a word in a dictionary.  
The speaker, then, is navigating a dynamic process through which she reaches more 
attuned responses to the situation, or maximal grip, through her apprehension of the world, or 
intentional arc (Dreyfus, 2002). While we cannot completely disallow representation, 
representation is not at all times necessary to understand goal orientation. Rather we can 
understand goal orientation as responding in a better way to the situation to reach this, perhaps 
undefined, best possible outcome. This process is not merely cognitive, but affective, involving 
emotions and feelings that assist in the apprehension and regulation of this situation (Barnacle, 
2009). This is an intensely social and cultural process, such that not only the speaker’s 
circumstances and experiences shape it, but that even the circumstances and experiences of the 
others in her linguistic community are influential (Collins, 2004; Hutto et al, forthcoming). These 
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experiences additionally navigate shifting modes of attunement (Heidegger, 1962) with respect 
to the language and failure and success dictate further attempts at expression. In understanding 
this responsive process as an act of disclosure that is affective, social and cognitive, SLA can be 
understood as a dynamic instance of skillful coping which is not merely based in manipulation of 
representations but instead based on this shared intersubjective world in which she is with others. 
In this context, the speaker expresses through this new, shared representation system. She 
is not bringing some representation out of the private world of her mind but making explicit her 
engagement with the world in a situated state and as a Mitsein through this shared representation 
system. Her perceptions, perspectives, beliefs and values are included in these acts of expression. 
There is no expression outside of what is communicated. There is no fluency within her, away 
from the eyes of her interlocutors. Her ability with the language and her presentation of herself is 
only present in what she expresses. In this way, she may often fall painfully short of what she has 
attempted to say, such that her own attention and that of others is directed to the language and to 
the nature of language, rather than the ends she had in the course of the conversation. In this 
sense, she chokes much like an athlete, and is shaken out of her habitual responses in the 
situation. 
However, she may achieve what she has attempted, or even go beyond what she would 
have thought she knew. The speaker may experience how she presents herself in a new way, in 
the context and eyes of a new culture and new language. In internalizing this language, she sees 
herself through the eyes of this other culture and language, which she has to whatever degree and 
for however long, adopted. The process of second language acquisition is deeply responsive, and 
a matter of dynamic negotiation within social and cultural contexts, with and through others, to 
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express one’s self and one’s world in a new form. To express well, or well enough, is the ever- 
changing target. 
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